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A Textual Approach to Treaty Non-Self-Execution
Michael D. Ramsey*
Conventional wisdom holds that the doctrine of non-selfexecuting treaties 1 in the United States is conceptually confused and
textually unjustified. This Article disagrees. It argues that a coherent,
text-based approach to non-self-execution is available and consistent
with the Constitution’s text and with the Supreme Court’s leading
non-self-execution decision, Medellín v. Texas. 2
To reach a satisfactory textual grounding for non-self-execution,
it is necessary to reject two central ideas in leading non-selfexecution dicta and commentary. The first is that non-self-execution
means that some treaties are not part of the supreme law of the land
(or, as it is sometimes said, not part of federal law). As discussed
below, 3 that is not a possible reading of the Constitution’s text,
which says that “all” treaties are part of the supreme law of the land 4
(apart from treaty provisions that conflict with superior forms of
law). 5 The second is that the unilateral intentions or preferences of
U.S. treatymakers can, without more, make a treaty unenforceable
by courts. 6 As discussed below, 7 unilateral intentions and preferences
cannot change the constitutional direction that judges “shall be
bound” by treaties. 8

* Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation Professor of Law and Director of International and
Comparative Law Programs, University of San Diego Law School. Thanks to David Moore,
Lisa Ramsey, Michael Rappaport, David Sloss, Carlos Vázquez and participants in the BYU
Law Review symposium on Treaties and the draft Restatement (Fourth) for helpful comments
and discussions.
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111(3)–(4), reporter’s note 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (discussing non-selfexecuting treaties).
2. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
3. See infra Section I.A.
4. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
5. See infra Section I.B.
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1987); CURTIS BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 42−43 (2013).
7. See infra Sections I.C. & II.B.6.
8. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Rejecting these two propositions does not, however, reject the
idea of non-self-executing treaties. This Article understands “nonself-executing” to describe a treaty provision that does not of its own
force provide a rule of decision for a U.S. court. This result may arise
in various ways, but they share a common characteristic: the treaty
provision calls for an action that, in the U.S. constitutional system, is
not appropriate for courts to take. In this situation, the courts are
directly or implicitly instructed by the treaty’s text not to implement
the treaty unless another branch provides guidance. Because the
treaty is binding on the courts, this direction—contained within the
treaty—is also binding on the courts. As a result, non-self-execution
arises from the treaty’s text in combination with the court’s judicial
power in the U.S. constitutional system.
This Article attempts to outline the textual approach to non-selfexecution in a relatively brief and summary form, relying on
extensive scholarship on the Constitution’s text and history relating
to non-self-execution. 9 As such, it is designed as a “restatement” of
textual approaches developed in part by others but presented here in

9. In particular: David H. Moore, Do U.S. Courts Discriminate Against Treaties?:
Equality, Duality and Non-Self-Execution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2228 (2010); John T. Parry,
Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of Treaties, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1209 (2009); David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitution Fallacy, 36
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Non-Self-Executing Treaties]; David L.
Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties,
53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 135 (2012) [hereinafter Executing Foster v. Neilson]; Carlos Manuel
Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of
Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008) [hereinafter Treaties as Law of the Land]; Carlos
Manuel Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999) [hereinafter
Laughing at Treaties]; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties,
89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695 (1995); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, NonSelf-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) [hereinafter
Globalism and the Constitution]; John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and
Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999); Ernest A. Young,
Treaties as “Part of Our Law,” 88 TEX. L. REV. 91 (2009). For my prior discussions of the
issue, see Michael D. Ramsey, Toward a Rule of Law in Foreign Affairs, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1450, 1469−73 (2006) (reviewing JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE
CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005) [hereinafter Toward a Rule of
Law]) and Michael D. Ramsey, The Supremacy Clause, Original Meaning and Modern Law, 74
OHIO ST. L.J. 559, 594−97 (2013) [hereinafter Supremacy Clause].
This Article does not address the question of whether and when a treaty creates private
rights of action, which it assumes to be a separate question from non-self-execution. See
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
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a more simplified manner. 10 Part I of the Article sets forth the basic
constitutional rules. Part II explains how non-self-execution arising
from a treaty’s text is consistent with the Constitution’s categorical
rules on a treaty’s status as law. Part III argues that the Court’s
opinion in Medellín is consistent with a textual approach to non-selfexecution, and provides examples of post-Medellín lower court
decisions implementing a textual approach. Part IV, in conclusion,
provides a basic three-part “restatement” of the textual approach to
treaty non-self-execution.
I. NON-SELF-EXECUTION AND THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT
A. The Constitution’s Basic Rules
The Constitution’s treatment of the legal status of treaties
appears straightforward and unqualified. Article VI, clause 2, states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding. 11

This language sets forth two related rules. First, all treaties,
categorically, are the supreme law of the land. Put in the negative, no
treaties are not the supreme law of the land. There can be no
distinction among treaties for this purpose; they all have the same
constitutional status. Further, this rule is embedded within the same
constitutional provision that makes the Constitution and federal
statutes the supreme law of the land. Thus, all treaties have the same
legal character as the Constitution and statutes, or, again put in the
negative, no treaties have a different legal character from the
Constitution and statutes. 12 Thus, any proposition that there is a
class of treaties, or a type of treaty provision, that is not part of
federal law (or some similar phrase) should be rejected (except, as
10. For more detailed commentary contributed to this symposium, see David Sloss, SelfExecution in the Restatement (Fourth) on Treaties, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1673 (2016); Carlos
Manuel Vázquez, Four Problems with the Draft Restatement’s Treatment of Treaty SelfExecution, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1747 (2016).
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
12. Carlos Vázquez calls this the “requirement of equivalent treatment.” Vázquez,
Treaties as Laws of the Land, supra note 9, at 611.
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explained below, when conflicts among the different kinds of
supreme law arise). 13
Second, under Article VI’s text, all treaties are binding on
judges—categorically, and to the same extent as statutes and the
Constitution, whose obligations are described in parallel language.
Again, to state the rule in negative form: no treaties are nonbinding
on judges nor entitled to be treated differently by judges than
statutes and the Constitution. Thus, to the extent there could be any
doubt what “supreme Law of the Land” meant, the last clause of this
paragraph of Article VI confirms that the phrase means, among other
things, that “judges . . . shall be bound thereby.” 14
B. Exceptions
The two related rules described above require two—but only
two—related qualifications, also arising from the second clause of
Article VI. First, a treaty provision may conflict with the
Constitution. The provision might purport to exercise a power that
the Constitution denies to the United States as a whole; it might
require that the United States alter the structure of government set
forth in the Constitution; or it might assert a power that the
Constitution exclusively vests in another branch of government. In
these cases, the U.S. treatymakers lack constitutional authority to
undertake the treaty obligation because the United States is
constitutionally prohibited from acting in ways that violate
the Constitution.

13. See infra Section I.B.
14. For similar textual accounts, see Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 9, at
2169−73; Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 9, at 45–55. Although this Article
presents a textual account, there is substantial historical evidence that the framers viewed
Article VI’s treatment of treaties in this way—that is, as making treaties equivalent to statutes.
See, e.g., David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 932 (2010); Ramsey, Toward a Rule of Law, supra note 9, at 1469–73; Vázquez, Treaties
as Law of the Land, supra note 9, at 619–28; Parry, supra note 9, at 1214–62. Alexander
Hamilton, for example, observed that treaties’ “true import, as far as respects individuals,
must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations.” Alexander Hamilton,
Federalist 22, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 143, 150 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Similarly,
James Madison wrote that treaties “have [the] force and operation of laws, and are to be a rule
for the courts in controversies between man and man, as much as any other laws.” James
Madison, Letters of Helvidius, No. 1, in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 138, 148 (Galliard
Hunt ed., 1906).
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It may seem structurally obvious that a treaty cannot supersede
the Constitution, but one need not resort to structure to answer the
question. By Article VI’s text, only treaties “made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States” gain the supreme
status that Article VI conveys. 15 The “Authority of the United
States” is set forth by the Constitution, which (as confirmed by the
Tenth Amendment) makes the U.S. government a government of
delegated powers plus specific prohibitions. 16 Powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, and acts prohibited by the
Constitution, are ultra vires—that is, not within the United States’
authority. 17 So, for example, the United States does not have
constitutional authority to grant titles of nobility; 18 a treaty provision
granting a title of nobility is not within the United States’ authority.
Thus that provision would not be part of supreme law nor binding
on judges (in the same manner that a statute granting a title of
nobility would not be part of supreme law). 19
Treaty provisions that exceed the constitutional authority of the
United States could be called “non-self-executing,” in the sense that
they require “execution” (implementation) by passing a
constitutional amendment before they can be part of supreme

15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
17. See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 17–20,
302–03 (2007) (discussing delegated powers structure and its implications for the
treatymaking power).
18. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
19. One might read “authority of the United States” to mean only “purported
authority” of the United States—that is, to mean treaties made on behalf of, or in the name of,
the United States. But that meaning could be achieved by just saying “Treaties made by the
United States”—omitting the phrase “under the authority.” To give effect to the phrase
“under the authority of,” the phase must mean more than “by.” The most natural reading of
“under the authority” is that it includes the things the United States is authorized to do and
excludes things the United States is not authorized to do.
It is true that Article VI’s textual requirement for supreme treaties—that they be made
under the authority of the United States—differs from its textual requirement for supreme
statutes—that they be made “in pursuance” of the Constitution. The difference in wording is
explained by the framers’ desire to make pre-ratification treaties, but not pre-ratification
statutes, part of supreme law. This is the obvious effect of the phrase “Treaties made, or which
shall be made”: existing treaties, or future treaties. Thus, a treaty is part of supreme law, from
the perspective of 1789, if it was made under the authority of the United States pursuant to
the Articles of Confederation or the Continental Congress’ pre-Articles authority, or if it is
made in the future under the authority of the United States pursuant to the Constitution.
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domestic law. 20 But it seems less confusing simply to call them
unconstitutional, and so reserve the label “non-self-executing” for a
different phenomenon.
A treaty provision might also violate the Constitution by
purporting to exercise a power the Constitution grants exclusively to
another branch of government. Here, there is an even greater
temptation to use the phrase “non-self-executing,” especially when
an exclusive power of Congress is involved. Although a treaty
provision purporting to exercise an exclusive power of Congress is
unconstitutional, the constitutional violation could be cured by
Congress exercising its power to do what the treaty purports to do.
Thus, if Congress has an exclusive power to appropriate funds, 21 and
a treaty purports to appropriate funds, the treaty provision is
unconstitutional—but Congress can cure the violation by making
the designated appropriation.
The term “non-self-executing” may seem somewhat more apt in
this situation because Congress could “execute” the treaty by (for
example) making the appropriation. But calling the treaty provision
unconstitutional on its own (subject to cure by congressional action)
is more precise. Conceptually, this type of provision is no different
from the example of a treaty provision that purports to exercise a
power constitutionally prohibited to the United States as a whole,
except in one case the violation can be cured by statute and in the
other it must be cured by constitutional amendment. In either case,
the treaty provision cannot become part of the supreme law of the
land because it is contrary to a superior form of law (the
Constitution). This terminology also parallels terminology in
analogous situations, where one branch purports to exercise the
exclusive power of another. For example, if Congress has an exclusive
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, 22 we would not say a
20. See Ramsey, Supremacy Clause, supra note 9, at 596–97 (adopting this terminology);
Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 9, at 2177 (same). In an earlier work, see Ramsey,
Supremacy Clause, supra note 9, at 596–97, I did not clearly distinguish between (a) a treaty
provision that purports to accomplish an unconstitutional act in itself and (b) a treaty provision
that commits the United States to perform in the future an act not permitted by the
Constitution. For example, a treaty might itself grant a title of nobility or it might direct that
the United States shall grant a title of nobility at a future time. The former provision is
unconstitutional; at the time the treaty is signed, the United States lacks authority to grant the
title. The latter provision, as explained in Part II infra, is non-self-executing (and can be
executed only by a constitutional amendment).
21. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
22. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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presidential decree suspending the writ is non-self-executing; we
would say it is unconstitutional. If Congress thereafter enacts
legislation ratifying the President’s action, we would say Congress
has approved the action and cured the constitutional defect. There is
no reason treaty terminology should differ. 23
In any event, the terminological issue here is mostly theoretical.
In practice U.S. treaties generally do not purport to exercise
exclusive powers of Congress. Despite contrary arguments dating to
the founding period, the textual list of Congress’ exclusive powers is
likely short, perhaps including only appropriations, declaring war and
possibly raising revenue. 24 Treaties have not generally purported to
exercise these powers. For example, although treaties routinely call
for money to be spent, treaties do not purport to make an
appropriation. Thus, what we would call a treaty provision that did
purport to exercise an exclusive power of Congress remains largely

23. Numerous commentators, most prominently Carlos Vázquez, describe these
provisions as a “‘constitutionality’ category” of non-self-executing treaties. See, e.g., Vázquez,
supra note 10, at 1751–54. As Professor Vázquez explains, however, treaty provisions in this
category are conceptually distinct from other types of non-self-executing treaty provisions
because they are not part of supreme law:
The non-self-executing character of [treaties that purport to exercise a power not
possessed by the treatymakers] is not just a matter of judicial enforceability. . . . Such
treaties are unconstitutional and thus do, indeed, lack the force of domestic law. The
fact that such treaties differ from other non-self-executing treaties because they lack
the force of domestic law is another reason to make clear that the ‘constitutionality’
category is separate and distinct . . . .
Vázquez, supra note 10, at 1754. See also BRADLEY, supra note 6, at 49–50 (describing such
treaties as non-self-executing). In my view, it is confusing to use the term “non-self-executing”
to describe two such distinct types of treaty provisions, especially when unconstitutional treaty
provisions can simply be described as unconstitutional.
24. Appropriations power is understood as exclusive because the framers appeared to
understand it that way. See RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 303 n.7; the text requires that
appropriations be made “by Law” but arguably treaties are laws for this purpose. Congress’
declare-war power is generally understood as exclusive by negative implication, at least in the
sense that the President cannot declare war. See Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War
Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543, 1597 (2002). If Congress’ power to declare war is exclusive
of the President, it seems also exclusive of the treatymakers for the same reason: the power to
declare includes the power not to declare, and a war once declared cannot be “undeclared.”
The exclusiveness of raising revenue arguably arises from the rule that bills for raising revenue
must originate in the House. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. A further textual candidate for
an exclusive power is Congress’ power to “dispose of . . . the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States.” See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; Edwards v. Carter, 445 F.
Supp. 1279 (D.D.C. 1978) (considering an exclusivity claim under the property clause but
dismissing for lack of standing).
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an academic question, and so to avoid confusion it remains best
simply to call it an unconstitutional treaty. 25
In sum, unconstitutionality is a textual exception to treaties’
textual status as supreme law binding on judges. We can restate the
rule as: All treaties are supreme law of the land and binding on
judges to the same extent as statutes and the Constitution, except for
treaty provisions that are unconstitutional because they purport (a)
to exercise a power the Constitution denies to the United States or
(b) to exercise a power the Constitution grants exclusively to another
branch of the U.S. government.
A second exception to treaties’ supremacy, which can be
mentioned here only briefly, arises where a treaty obligation conflicts
with a statute. The Constitution’s text does not directly resolve this
conflict because Article VI gives constitutional treaties and
constitutional statutes the same status and priority (while making
both superior to state laws and state constitutions). Modern law
resolves it through the later-in-time rule (a later statute trumps an
earlier treaty and vice-versa). 26 Assuming this is a correct reading of
the text and its historical background, 27 that rule provides an
additional exception to treaties’ domestic legal status: a treaty
provision is not part of the supreme law of the land, and not binding
on judges, if it conflicts with a later-in-time statute. Again, one could
call such a treaty obligation “non-self-executing” (because it could
be “executed” by Congress passing a new statute) but nothing is
gained from using that phrase and it risks confusion with other
versions of non-self-execution. A better approach is simply to state
the exception clearly.

25. As noted, see supra note 20, treaties that call on Congress to take action (including
actions within Congress’ exclusive powers) are properly called non-self-executing; their role is
discussed in the next Section.
26. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
27. See Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties
and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319 (2005) (defending the later-in-time rule on the basis of
text and original understanding). But see Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law, 100
NW. U. L. REV. 1479 (2006) (arguing that all statutes override treaties (even later-in-time
treaties) based on the relative placement of treaties and statutes in Article VI); LOUIS HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 210, 488 n.135 (2d ed. 1996)
(suggesting possible bases for arguing that treaties are constitutionally superior to statutes).
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C. Summary and Implications
We can sum the foregoing discussion with a straightforward rule:
All treaties are supreme law of the land and binding on judges to the
same extent as statutes and the Constitution, except for (1) treaty
provisions that conflict with the Constitution because they purport
(a) to exercise a power denied to the United States by the
Constitution or (b) to exercise a power the Constitution grants
exclusively to another branch, and (2) treaty provisions that conflict
with a later-in-time statute. Or, putting the proposition as a negative,
nothing other than the Constitution or a later-in-time statute can
prevent a treaty provision from being part of the supreme law of the
United States and binding on judges in the same respect as the
Constitution and statutes.
In particular, the preferences or intent of U.S. treaty negotiators
or approving Senators cannot keep a treaty from being supreme law
of the land and binding on judges in the same manner as the
Constitution and statutes. U.S. treatymakers may prefer that a treaty
provision not have this status, perhaps to preserve flexibility.
However, the Constitution commands (rightly or wrongly) that all
treaties must have this status (unless displaced by a superior form of
law). The unilateral acts or intents of U.S. treatymakers are not law
(and, most importantly, are not part of the supreme law listed in
Article VI). The negotiators’ preferences cannot displace the
Constitution—any more than, for example, the President’s
preferences can displace the constitutional status of any other form
of law. 28 If it were otherwise, it could not be the case that “all”
treaties have supreme status.
But even though all treaties have the same legal status (apart
from those that conflict with the Constitution or later-in-time
statutes), this does not mean that there are no such things as nonself-executing treaty provisions. Rather, it means that the provisions’
non-self-executing character must arise from the treaty itself. And
non-self-execution, in this sense, cannot mean that the treaty is not
part of the supreme law of the land or that the treaty is not binding
on judges. Instead, it must mean that the treaty obligation is not of
28. See Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 9, at 12–18, 45–80 (explaining
and criticizing doctrines that give effect to the intent of U.S. treatymakers regarding selfexecution); Vázquez, supra note 10, at 1770–74 (criticizing the draft Restatement’s position
on intent of the U.S. treatymakers).
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the nature that can form a rule of decision for U.S. courts. The next
Section explains this proposition.
II. NON-SELF-EXECUTION AND TREATY TEXT
A. The Textual Basis for Non-Self-Executing Treaty Provisions
The foregoing discussion might seem to suggest that the
Constitution does not allow non-self-executing treaty provisions
(apart from treaty provisions inconsistent with superior law). If all
treaties are part of the supreme law of the land and binding on
judges, how can a treaty provision not be enforceable by a U.S.
court? The key is to recognize that the question whether a treaty is
supreme law is separate from the question whether its provisions
create a rule of decision (meaning a rule capable of resolving
disputes) for U.S. courts.
A treaty’s text may indicate that it does not provide judicial rules
of decision in a number of ways. Most obviously, it might expressly
declare that its provisions are obligations of another branch of
government, or it might expressly declare that its provisions are not
subject to judicial remedies, perhaps by providing an exclusive
alternative remedy. Article VI provides that U.S. courts are bound by
a treaty’s provisions, 29 so if the treaty’s provisions preclude courts
from using them as rules of decision, then courts are bound by that
direction. This may appear a contradiction, but it is not—what is
binding on the court is all of the treaty, including its direction not to
use it as a rule of decision.
Alternatively, a treaty provision might preclude its use as a
judicial rule of decision implicitly, by calling for a type of action that
(at least in the U.S. system) is not appropriately performed by
courts. Under Article III, Section 1, U.S. courts only exercise “the
judicial Power.” 30 In their exercise of the judicial power, courts must
use treaty provisions (if applicable) as rules of decision. But if a treaty
provision calls on the United States to exercise something other than
the judicial power, it does not contain a rule that U.S. courts can use
to decide cases. This does not mean the provision is not part of the
supreme law of the land; it means only that the provision does not
require anything that is within U.S. courts’ judicial power to do.
29. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
30. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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Importantly, constitutional and statutory provisions are subject
to a similar analysis. Sometimes they are found not to provide a rule
of decision, even though they are supreme law of the land. For
example, the political question doctrine holds that some
constitutional provisions are directed exclusively to other branches,
or do not provide a sufficiently definite rule to be a rule of decision
for courts. 31 Further, as Ernest Young points out, “some statutes
create judicially enforceable rights, but some do not; . . . some
statutes are simply contracts between the states and the federal
government, the performance of which are largely governed by
politics and the good faith of the parties.” 32 Similarly, “a regulatory
statute might direct an administrative agency to address a particular
problem but leave development of the operative regulations to the
agency.” 33 In sum, there is no necessary link between status as
supreme law of the land and capacity to operate as a rule of decision
in court. The former arises from the law’s source; the latter arises
from the type of obligations it imposes.
It follows from this discussion that non-self-execution in this
sense arises from the treaty’s text. The type of obligation the treaty
creates is decisive. If the treaty’s text creates an obligation
appropriate to serve as a rule of decision in U.S. courts in their
exercise of “the judicial Power,” Article VI requires that U.S. courts
use it as a rule of decision. No non-Article VI law or prudential
consideration should stand in the way (assuming, of course, the case
is properly before the court in other respects). But if the treaty’s text
creates an obligation that is not appropriate to serve as a rule of
decision for U.S. courts, judges should properly decline to apply it,
without creating any tension with Article VI: they are simply
following the direction of the treaty. 34

31. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427–30 (2012); see Vázquez, Laughing at
Treaties, supra note 9, at 2180 (pointing out the relationship between non-self-execution
doctrine and political question doctrine); Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 9,
at 1979 (same).
32. Young, supra note 9, at 113.
33. Id. at 110–11.
34. As discussed further below, I differ from Professor Vázquez in viewing non-selfexecution in this sense as consisting of a single category rather than two. See Vázquez, supra
note 10, at 1750 (separately describing a category of provisions that are non-self-executing
because they are “too vague for judicial enforcement or otherwise require[] policy judgments
of a nonjudicial nature” and provisions that are non-self-executing “because the treaty itself
contemplates that its aims will be accomplished through the enactment of legislation”). I
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B. Applying Textual Non-Self-Execution
1. Treaty provisions expressly directed to the political branches
The most obvious examples of treaty provisions that do not
contain a rule of decision for courts are provisions that expressly call
on another branch to act. For instance, Article 5 of the 1783 Treaty
of Peace with Britain directed that “Congress shall earnestly
recommend it to the Legislatures of the respective States” that
confiscated loyalist property should be restored. 35 (Under the
Articles of Confederation, Congress generally lacked legislative
power and so could only “recommend” on this point; 36 a more
modern version might read, “Congress shall provide” that loyalist
property be restored.) Plainly, this provision leaves nothing for
courts to do since the obligatory action is specifically designated as
one to be taken by Congress.
This conclusion, however, does not come solely from the treaty.
If U.S. courts had power to order Congress to enact legislation, such
a provision could be a rule of decision in a suit requesting such an
order (assuming a proper plaintiff could be found). But in the U.S.
system, courts are not understood to have this power as an
application of the political question doctrine: whether and how to
enact legislation is a political question entrusted to Congress. 37 As a
result, the non-self-executing status of the treaty provision arises
from a combination of the treaty’s text (which imposes an obligation
on Congress) and the constitutional power of U.S. courts (which
does not include power to compel action by Congress). 38 It is not
the case that the treaty is not binding on the judiciary (in the sense
that the judiciary can disregard its directions); rather, the treaty is
would instead describe a single phenomenon—treaty provisions that, expressly or implicitly, do
not provide rules that U.S. courts can apply.
35. Definitive Treaty of Peace, art. 5, U.S.-Gr.Br., Sept. 30, 1783, 2 U.S.T. 151.
36. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX (listing powers of Congress).
37. I leave aside the question of whether Congress is constitutionally obliged to pass the
acts called for in the treaty. See Parry, supra note 9, at 1276–94 (discussing the various
opinions on this question expressed during the 1795 Jay Treaty debates).
38. See Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson, supra note 9, at 143–53 (describing this “two
step” approach to non-self-execution). While I generally endorse the two-step approach
described by Professor Sloss, I think the steps may not be as sharply distinct as he suggests. As
discussed below, see infra Section II.B.2, the international obligation may often be drafted
with an eye to how it will interact with domestic legal systems, as the example of the 1783
peace treaty shows.
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binding but the provision does not give any direction to courts
because it contains no rule a court can apply.
This point was well understood in the founding era. The
Constitution’s framers drafted Article VI with the 1783 Peace Treaty
specifically in mind; that treaty contained the direction to Congress
described above, but it also contained the requirement that British
creditors “meet no legal obstacle” in recovering pre-war debts, a
provision the Court famously found appropriate as a judicial rule of
decision in Ware v. Hylton. 39 In Ware, Justice Chase observed: “No
one can doubt that a treaty may stipulate, that certain acts shall be
done by the Legislature; that other acts shall be done by the
Executive; and others by the Judiciary.” 40
To be sure, treaties do not directly make this stipulation very
often. But considering the result when they do illustrates that nonself-executing treaties are not a conceptual contradiction. A treaty
provision expressly directed to Congress requires the courts to let
Congress implement it.
2. Treaty provisions implicitly directed to the political branches
Although treaty provisions may not often expressly name a
particular branch of government, they more commonly call for
actions that in the U.S. system are not appropriately undertaken by
courts. The effect is the same as for the type of provision discussed in
the preceding Section, except the treaty’s direction is implicit rather
than explicit. But again, the courts are bound by the treaty’s
direction that it be implemented by another branch.
Consider, for example, a treaty provision directing criminal
punishment of particular conduct. While a treaty probably could
constitutionally define an offense and a punishment with enough

39. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796); see David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S.
Dodge, International Law in the Supreme Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 7, 13–14 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey
& William S. Dodge, eds., 2011) (discussing Ware).
40. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 244 (opinion of Chase, J.). See Parry, supra note 9, at 1266–67
& n.284 (pointing out other supporting passages in Chase’s opinion). Notably, this treaty
provision presumably was not self-executing in the United States prior to adoption of the
Constitution, because courts in the United States previously followed the English
understanding that treaty provisions were not judicially enforceable. See Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
at 271, 277 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (making this point).
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specificity that a U.S. court could impose it, 41 typically treaties do
not do so. Rather, they call for criminal penalties to be imposed in
non-specific terms. For example, the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provides: “[t]he
Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their
respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to
the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to
provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or of any of
the other acts enumerated in article III.” 42
Although the treaty has a specific definition of genocide, it does
not further specify what the “effective penalties” should be; at least
in the modern U.S. system, our understanding is that the
establishment of a range of penalties is a legislative act; further, the
treaty’s reference to “enact[ing] . . . legislation,” although not
specifically mentioning Congress, appears addressed to Congress in
the U.S. system because only Congress can enact legislation. The
same would be true of a treaty provision that more generally refers to
an obligation to establish a criminal offense. Such provisions cannot
be rules of decision in U.S. court, not because of anything the
Constitution says about treaties, but because legislative power is
vested in Congress and creating an offense and punishment is a
legislative (lawmaking) power that cannot be undertaken by U.S.
courts. 43 Thus, the treaty provision’s lack of effect in U.S. court
arises from a combination of the treaty’s text and the Constitution’s
assignment of powers.
In some cases, an implicit direction to Congress is necessary
because the treaty cannot on constitutional grounds accomplish the
objective directly—typically because Congress has an exclusive
41. Commentators have often assumed that treaties cannot constitutionally provide for
criminal punishment. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1987). I see no textual or historical basis for that
view. Nothing in the Constitution’s text suggests that Congress has a general exclusive power
of criminal punishment. Although the Fifth Amendment requires “due process of law” for the
deprivation of life, liberty, or property, a treaty (being part of supreme law) would seem
sufficient if it were adequately specific as to the crime and the punishment.
42. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. V,
Dec. 9, 1948, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 81-1, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; see also Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on Their Destruction art. VII, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45
(calling for “penal legislation” regarding prohibited activities but not providing any penalties).
43. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; United States v. Hudson & Goodwin,
11 U.S. 32 (1811).
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power. For example, treaty provisions often call for the expenditure
of money but do not make an appropriation. 44 Because under U.S.
law an appropriation is required, and because appropriations can
only be made “by Law,” 45 the treaty’s spending obligation does not
involve courts, which cannot make “Law” in this sense. Thus, courts
cannot make an appropriation, and in the U.S. separation-of-powers
system they cannot order Congress to make an appropriation. As
discussed above, if appropriation is an exclusive power of Congress,
U.S. treaty obligations must be framed this way. 46 But in any event,
U.S. treaty obligations invariably are framed this way, and thus they
do not provide any rule for courts. 47
Although non-self-execution in this sense is often discussed in
connection with directions to Congress, treaty provisions also may
be, and commonly are, addressed to the executive branch. For
example, in the 1778 Treaty of Alliance with France, the United
States undertook to “guarantee . . . from the present time and
forever, against all other powers . . . the present Possessions of the
Crown of [F]rance in America . . . .”48 Although what this guarantee
required seems somewhat ambiguous, in any event it involves
decisions about the use of military force, a power of the President as
commander-in-chief (perhaps, depending on the circumstances, in
conjunction with Congress’ power to declare war). Under the U.S.
system the courts cannot manage military operations nor tell the
President how to manage military operations, as that is not part of
their Article III judicial power. 49
44. For example, the 1794 Jay Treaty called for expenditures to support a claims
commission, but did not purport to make an appropriation; Congress passed an implementing
act that made the appropriate appropriation. See Parry, supra note 9, at 1276–94.
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
46. See supra notes 24–25. That is, if Congress’ power is exclusive, treaty provisions
cannot themselves purport to make an appropriation.
47. In connection with a proposed treaty with Algiers, Thomas Jefferson as Secretary of
State advised that “where a treaty contains such articles only as will go into execution of
themselves, or be carried into execution by the judges, they may be safely made: but where
there are articles which require a law to be passed [afterwards] by the legislature, great caution
is requisite.” Thomas Jefferson, Memorandum of Conference with the President on Treaty with
Algiers, Mar. 11, 1792, 23 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 256 (Charles T. Cullen et al., eds.
1990). Jefferson was presumably speaking of appropriations, since the proposed treaty
contemplated payment to Algiers. See Parry, supra note 9, at 1275.
48. Treaty of Alliance, U.S.-Fr., art. 11, Feb. 6, 1778, 2 U.S.T. 35.
49. Note that a treaty provision directed to the executive, although non-self-executing
from the perspective of the judiciary, is binding on the President: it is part of the supreme law
(as all treaties are, unless contrary to the Constitution or a later-in-time statute) and the
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This framework is entirely consistent with Justice Chase’s
observation in Ware that treaties can “stipulate” for actions to be
taken by the courts, the legislature, or the executive. Sometimes
treaties make those stipulations directly, but sometimes the
stipulation can arise from the type of action required. 50
3. Foster v. Neilson and ambiguously directed treaty provisions
In contrast to the explicit or implicit directions to other branches
discussed above, self-execution arises from a treaty provision that is
directed to the judiciary. Again, this could be explicit. The Warsaw
Convention on air carrier liability directly addresses what effect it will
have in court, 51 and in the U.S. system there is no constitutional
barrier to the courts adopting its directions as rules of decision. The
Convention on the International Sale of Goods provides rules for
courts to apply in adjudicating contract disputes; although it does
not expressly say it is directed to courts, implicitly it addresses courts
(in the U.S. system) because it is a set of rules that courts are
obviously expected to apply in ordinary contract disputes. 52 These
provisions are self-executing in the U.S. system because they
“stipulate” (to use Justice Chase’s word) 53 for actions by courts.
Sometimes, however, it may be difficult to tell how the treaty
provision is directed, requiring close interpretation of the text. Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion in Foster v. Neilson, 54 now seen as the

President per Article II, Section 3 must take care that the laws are faithfully executed. Thus, as
a constitutional matter the President was bound to faithfully execute the 1778 treaty’s
guarantee, albeit with considerable discretion and not subject to judicial oversight.
50. In countries such as Britain, where courts lack power to use treaty provisions as rules
of decision without implementing legislation, even very specific court-oriented treaty
provisions would be regarded as directed to another branch. See Vázquez, Treaties as Law of
the Land, supra note 9, at 614–15. This point further illustrates that non-self-execution arises
from a combination of the treaty’s text and the constitution of the implementing nation (and
thus, the treaty provision may be self-executing in one domestic system and non-self-executing
in another). Again, this is not a contradiction but a logical result of the interaction between the
treaty text and the domestic constitutional system.
51. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage
by Air, arts. 17–30, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 2 U.S.T. 983 (specifically describing
the extent of the carrier’s liability and directing how and where an “action for damages” can
be brought).
52. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
53. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 244 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.).
54. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
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foundation of U.S. non-self-execution doctrine, is an example of a
court addressing this sort of ambiguity. A provision in a treaty
between the United States and Spain stated (in the English language
version) that certain land titles in land ceded from Spain to the
United States “shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in
possession of the lands.” 55 Did this mean that the treaty itself
confirmed the land titles, or did it mean that the treaty obligated the
United States to take some future action to confirm the titles?
Marshall in Foster thought the latter. 56 Although not spelled out in
the opinion, Marshall apparently also thought that the future action
could only be taken by Congress, not by courts (presumably because
it was an act of lawmaking). 57 Thus Marshall in effect read the treaty
provision as if it said: “Congress shall confirm all land titles.”
Assuming that is what the treaty provision meant, Marshall was
correct that courts could not use it as a rule of decision. That is not
because the treaty was not part of the supreme law of the land or
because its provisions were not binding on courts, but rather because
the relevant provision, by its own terms, did not provide a rule of
decision for U.S. courts. 58 To be sure, commentators have criticized
the way Marshall read the treaty as unhelpful and confusing, and in a
later case Marshall changed his mind about the particular treaty: after
seeing the Spanish language version of the same treaty, he concluded
it was not a call for future lawmaking action but an immediate
declaration that the titles were confirmed. Accordingly, he decided,
the treaty provision did provide a rule of decision for courts. 59
But whatever the correct reading of the Spanish treaty, Marshall’s
underlying theory follows from Justice Chase’s observation in Ware
that treaties might call for acts by the judiciary or for acts by nonjudicial branches. As Marshall put it, the question was whether the
55. Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, U.S.-Sp., art. 8., Feb. 22, 1819, 3 U.S.T. 3.
56. See Foster, 27 U.S. at 314–15 (“The article under consideration does not declare
that all the grants . . . shall be valid. . . . It does not say that those grants are hereby confirmed.
Had such been the language, it would have acted directly on the subject, and would have
repealed those acts of congress which were repugnant to it. . . .”). For discussion and criticism,
see Carlos M. Vázquez, Foster v. Neilson and United States v. Percheman: Judicial
Enforcement of Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 151, 152–68 (John E. Noyes et al.
eds., 2007); Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson, supra note 9, at 153–62; Sloss, Non-SelfExecuting Treaties, supra note 9, at 19–23.
57. See Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson, supra note 9, at 153–62.
58. See Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 9, at 2181–82.
59. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833); see also Vázquez, supra note
56, at 169–74.
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treaty “addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department”
such that “the legislature must execute the contract before it can
become a rule for the Court.” 60 Framing it as a question of what the
treaty language directed, Marshall’s version of non-self-execution
was entirely consistent with Article VI of the Constitution: it did not
purport to make a treaty provision not part of supreme law or
nonbinding—it only recognized that some binding supreme law
nonetheless might not provide a rule of decision for courts because
of the way it was drafted. In this sense, Foster was not the creation
of new doctrine but an application of a judicial understanding
dating at least to Ware. 61
Some commentators have criticized focusing on treaty text to
determine non-self-execution because (they say) treaties are not
typically drafted with domestic implementation in mind; rather,
treaties are international instruments often involving nations with
various ways of implementing their obligations. 62 While of course it is
true that every country has its own method of implementing treaties,
this criticism seems misplaced on at least four grounds. First,
treatymakers often have an option between stating an obligation
specifically and directly or framing an obligation more generally to
allow some discretion in implementation. Regardless of the method
of domestic implementation, the latter is likely chosen to provide
flexibility in implementation, which is consistent with the obligation
being treated, in the U.S. system, as addressed to Congress or the
Executive. 63 Second, it seems untrue that treatymakers are generally
uninterested in domestic implementation; in the absence of strong
international courts, the efficacy of the treaty may be linked to its
domestic enforceability. 64 Third, U.S. treatymakers are strongly
interested in how the treaty will be implemented in the United

60. Foster, 27 U.S. at 314.
61. See Parry, supra note 9, at 1305–28 (illustrating continuity between Foster and
earlier discussions of non-self-execution); John T. Parry, The Political Theory of Treaties in the
Restatements of Foreign Relations Law, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1581, 1594–97 (2016) (same).
62. See, e.g., BRADLEY, supra note 6, at 42−43.
63. In countries where treaties are not directly part of domestic law, this distinction is of
less consequence, because in either event the legislature must implement it before courts can
act. But greater or lesser specificity will nonetheless affect how much implementation
discretion the legislature has.
64. See HENKIN, supra note 27, at 201 n.** (“Other parties to a treaty, of course, prefer
that a treaty be self-executing in the United States in order that they may enjoy rights under it
immediately upon proclamation of the treaty . . . .”).
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States, and while U.S. treatymakers cannot wholly control the way
the treaty is drafted, they may have substantial influence upon it. 65 As
a result, it does not seem anomalous to think that a treaty’s language
should shape the type of domestic obligation it represents. Fourth, in
any event, the treatymakers’ purpose in drafting the provision is not
the touchstone of the inquiry. If the treaty creates obligations on the
United States that U.S. courts cannot implement, it does not matter
whether the treaty parties intended to have them enforced judicially.
And conversely, if the treaty creates obligations U.S. courts can
implement, the Constitution requires them to do so, irrespective of the
intent (or lack of intent) of the treaty parties. Thus, intent of the treaty
parties is neither necessary nor sufficient to determine self execution.
In sum, the rule can be stated thus: a treaty provision cannot be
enforced by U.S. courts if the provision by its own terms is implicitly
or explicitly directed to another branch of government. A treaty is
implicitly directed to another branch if it (intentionally or not) calls
on the United States to perform some action that is not
appropriately performed by the judicial power. 66
4. Vague and aspirational provisions
In modern law, it is commonly said that vague and aspirational
provisions are non-self-executing. That is correct, but these
provisions are best understood as an illustration of the foregoing
rule. Their vague or aspirational nature makes clear that they are not
directed to the judiciary because they do not contain a clear enough
rule for U.S. courts (which are not lawmakers) to implement
without legislative guidance. 67 As in the general case, the non-self65. See id. at 201 (“In particular instances, United States negotiators have been careful
to make clear that the treaty will require Congressional implementation: in the North Atlantic
Treaty, for example, it was accepted by all parties that no events would put the United States
automatically at war; if war were called for, Congress would have to declare it.”).
66. Some language in Foster, and some interpretations of it, suggest that any time a
treaty calls for future action it is not enforceable by courts. That is an oversimplification. Some
future actions can be implemented by courts. For example, the treaty provision at issue in
Ware required that impediments to collection of British debts be disregarded. Definitive Treaty
of Peace, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. 4, Sept. 3, 1783, 2 U.S.T. 151. Courts could implement that
obligation (as the Supreme Court held in Ware) because courts had constitutional power to
remove the legal impediments by disregarding them in judicial proceedings. See Sloss, Ramsey
& Dodge, supra note 39, at 13–14.
67. See Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 9, at 2178–80. As noted, Professor
Vázquez treats these types of provisions as a distinct category from those expressly directed to
Congress. See Vázquez, supra note 10, at 1749–50. I doubt anything substantive turns on the
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executing character arises from the text of the treaty provision
combined with the constitutional nature of the U.S. judiciary as an
adjudicative body rather than a legislature. Because these provisions
leave substantial discretion as to how they are implemented, they are
not adjudicative rules in the sense that Marshall explained in
Marbury v. Madison. 68 To be sure, it may be a very difficult question
whether a provision is too vague or open-ended to be a judicial rule,
especially because in the U.S. system courts commonly adjudicate
open-ended constitutional provisions. But conceptually the point
should be readily understood: a provision does not provide a rule of
decision for courts if it leaves substantial legislative or executive
policy discretion in how it is to be implemented. 69
5. Reservations and declarations of non-self-execution
In modern law, the U.S. Senate in giving its advice and consent
to a treaty sometimes includes a proviso that the treaty (or a
provision of the treaty) is non-self-executing. This Section considers
how such Senate actions should be understood under a textual
approach to non-self-execution. 70
To begin, the Senate cannot declare that a treaty is not supreme
law of the land or that its provisions are not binding on judges. As
discussed, Article VI says that all treaties have these characteristics
and the Senate cannot change the Constitution. 71 However, the
Senate can indicate that a treaty’s provisions are directed to Congress
and not to the courts.
The Senate could accomplish this outcome directly by requiring
the President and the U.S. treaty partners to revise the treaty using
different terminology, but I prefer to emphasize the conceptual similarity of the two. In
particular, vague treaty provisions are often likely drafted as they are with the expectation that
they generally will be implemented by legislatures or executives, rather than courts.
68. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (distinguishing between rules of decision for
courts and political questions that involve the exercise of non-judicial discretion).
69. Moreover, by their nature as diplomatic instruments, treaties commonly contain
vague or aspirational provisions. As a result, treaty provisions that are non-self-executing on
this ground should not be regarded as an anomaly.
70. See generally Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S Senate
Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571 (1991)
(arguing for the unconstitutionality of declarations); Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land,
supra note 9, at 672–85 (discussing the validity of non-self-executing reservations and
declarations). For more detailed discussion of differing types of non-self-execution
declarations, see Sloss, supra note 10, at 1714–21.
71. See supra Section I.A.
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language expressly addressing Congress before giving its consent.
Alternatively, it could adopt a reservation to the treaty stating
something to the effect of “in the United States, provisions of this
treaty will be implemented in a manner determined by Congress.”
The latter seems equivalent to the former for non-self-execution
purposes, as reservations become part of the treaty itself. In both
situations, the treaty’s non-self-executing status is contained within
the treaty’s text, and thus is a binding direction to U.S. courts to
leave implementation to Congress. Treaty provisions covered by such
reservations are thus non-self-executing without posing any textual
difficulties, in the same manner as the treaty provisions discussed in
prior Subsections.
A more difficult question arises if the Senate includes a nonself-execution proviso only in a unilateral declaration or
understanding—a statement internal to the United States that does
not become part of the treaty. 72 These declarations have been
treated as binding on courts, 73 but textually there is little ground
for doing so, and indeed they illustrate the key distinction between
a textual and non-textual approach to non-self-execution. As set
forth above, a treaty provision can be taken out of the competency
of courts either (a) by a superior act of lawmaking (the
Constitution or a subsequent inconsistent statute) or (b) by the
treaty provision itself (by directing its obligation to another branch
or precluding judicial remedies). Senate declarations are neither
superior law in themselves (they are not law at all) nor are they part
of the treaty. If a treaty provision is otherwise appropriate as a rule
of decision for courts (that is, if it is not contrary to superior law
and it is not directed to another branch), Article VI requires that
judges apply it as a rule of decision (because judges are bound by
it). 74 The Senate declaration amounts to a pronouncement that
judges are not bound by it (contrary to Article VI). 75
72. See, e.g., Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. Res., 102d Cong., 138 C ONG.
R EC . S4783–84 (1992).
73. See, e.g., Igartúa-de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005)
(en banc).
74. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
75. One might attempt to avoid this conclusion by arguing that Article II conveys on
the treatymakers the power to decide unilaterally that treaty provisions are not binding on
judges. However, the relevant Article II power is only to “make Treaties.” U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2. Nothing in Article II speaks at all to the relationship between treaties, once they are
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Under a textual analysis, Senate declarations (and other indicia
of the treatymakers’ understanding) would still be relevant where
the effect of the treaty is unclear from the treaty language. Courts
might appropriately treat them as evidence of the treaty’s meaning
on the question whether the treaty language creates a rule of
decision for courts. But declarations and other unilateral acts
cannot (under a textual analysis) be regarded as altering the treaty’s
status as binding domestic law. 76
6. The intent of U.S. treatymakers
Some commentary and court decisions indicate that the
touchstone of non-self-execution is the intent of the U.S.
treatymakers (assuming that this intent is not expressed in a Senate
declaration). 77 The foregoing discussion should make clear that,
under a textual approach, reliance on unexpressed intent carries the
same difficulties as reliance on Senate declarations. Like declarations,
evidence of (or even speculation about) the U.S. treatymakers’ intent
may be relevant to assess the meaning of a treaty’s text. For example,
if it is plain that during negotiation of a treaty, the U.S. negotiators
believed the treaty would not provide a rule of decision for U.S.
courts absent implementing legislation, that would be evidence of
made, and U.S. courts. That relationship is defined by Article VI, and it is stated in absolute
terms. To the extent there is a power to modify a treaty’s domestic effect, that power should
be understood as a power of Congress, which can use its power to create later-in-time supreme
law to direct how a treaty should be implemented. See Michael D. Ramsey, Congress’s Limited
Power to Enforce Treaties, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539 (2015) (defending Congress’s
authority over treaty implementation as part of its power to make laws necessary and proper to
carry into execution powers vested in other branches of government).
If there were founding-era history suggesting such an Article II power, that might be
cause for reassessment, but there is none. As discussed, Foster and related founding-era
commentary show how treaty language can make a provision unsuited to be a rule of decision
for courts, and that conclusion is entirely consistent with Article VI. Article VI makes a treaty
provision binding, but (of course) only to the extent of the obligation actually contained in the
treaty. In contrast, the Senate declaration is not contained in the treaty, and so is an attempt to
change the effect of Article VI. See Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 9, at 35–44
(making this argument while also accepting that a Senate declaration can preclude a private
right of action in federal court).
76. To be clear, this analysis is limited to the Constitution’s text. One could argue that
non-self-executing declarations have been validated by practice. Further, it might be the case
that the non-self-executing declaration is not severable from the Senate’s consent, and thus if
the declaration is invalid the Senate’s consent (and thus the U.S. ratification) is defective from
a constitutional standpoint.
77. E.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REV.
131, 149−57.
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the treaty’s meaning (although it might be outweighed by
other evidence).
Ultimately, however, the touchstone is the treaty’s meaning, not
the unilateral intent of the U.S. treatymakers, because only the treaty
itself is part of supreme law. If a treaty provision, interpreted in
accord with all relevant evidence, appears to establish a rule of
decision suitable for U.S. courts, then as a constitutional matter U.S.
courts must apply it, because pursuant to Article VI it is “supreme
Law” and judges are “bound thereby.” The U.S. treatymakers
cannot change that status, even if they would prefer a different one,
because they cannot make supreme law under Article VI (other than
by incorporating it into the treaty itself). As Carlos Vázquez
concludes, the idea that unilateral intent of U.S. treatymakers, not
incorporated into the treaty’s language, can make a treaty non-selfexecuting “would be to recognize a form of federal law-making not
specified in the Constitution.” 78
To be clear, the matter does not necessarily turn on finding a
shared intent of the treaty parties regarding self-execution or nonself-execution. The parties may not have had such a shared intent,
because the non-U.S. party or parties may not have had a view on
how the treaty should be enforced in the United States. The
potential absence of a shared view does not, however, indicate that
the unilateral view of the U.S. treatymakers should prevail. Rather,
the key question is not what the treaty parties intended to happen
regarding domestic enforcement, but whether their mutually agreed
text expressed the type of obligation that can be applied as a rule of
decision in a U.S. court. Phrasing it in this way covers both (1) the
situation in which the treaty parties intended to direct the treaty
obligation to the U.S. political branches and (2) the situation in
which the treaty parties created an obligation that in the U.S. system
is necessarily directed to the political branches, whether or not they
intended it to have that effect.

78. Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 9, at 638–41. Thus, as Professor
Vázquez further explains, “the ultimate question is what the treaty means, and the expressed
intent of the U.S. treatymakers is relevant solely as evidence of that meaning.” Vázquez, supra
note 10, at 1770.
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7. Summary: textual non-self-execution
In sum, non-self-execution arises when the text of a treaty
provision directs itself to a part of government other than the
judiciary. This may be done expressly, by reciting that Congress or
the President shall take a designated action. It may also be done
implicitly by calling on the United States to take an action that (in
the U.S. constitutional system) cannot be taken by the judiciary. A
vague or aspirational provision, or one that otherwise anticipates
future acts of lawmaking or executive discretion, thus will be nonself-executing because (a) standing alone it is not a rule of decision,
and (b) providing the specificity needed to make it a rule of decision
is not a judicial act.
Notably, however, non-self-execution is a function of the way
treaty obligations are drafted—principally, whether they provide a
rule of decision in themselves or call for future development of a
rule. A provision that is specific enough to provide a rule of decision
and does not call for lawmaking action or executive policy discretion
is binding on courts; it cannot be made nonbinding by unenacted
intent or preferences of other branches. 79
III. APPLICATION IN MEDELLÍN V. TEXAS AND BEYOND
This Section considers whether the Supreme Court’s non-selfexecution ruling in Medellín v. Texas 80 follows the foregoing textual
outline of non-self-execution. 81 It concludes that Medellín, read
properly, deploys the textual framework although Medellín’s
conclusion as to the particular treaty provision at issue may be
doubted. This Section further examines two post-Medellín lower
court opinions to illustrate how a textual approach to non-selfexecution can be implemented in light of Medellín.

79. See Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 9, at 638–41 (rejecting idea
that unilateral intent of U.S. treatymakers, not incorporated into the treaty’s language, can
make a treaty non-self-executing because that “would be to recognize a form of federal lawmaking not specified in the Constitution”).
80. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
81. Medellín has been criticized as inconsistent with a text-based approach. See, e.g.,
Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson, supra note 9, at 182–87; Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the
Land, supra note 9, at 646–68. For a defense of the case based on the U.S. treatymakers’
intent, see Bradley, supra note 77.
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A. Medellín and the Textual Approach.
Although not entirely free from doubt, the Court’s decision in
Medellín can be read to endorse a textual approach to treaty nonself-execution. Crucially, the Medellín majority emphasized the text
of the treaty. Its substantive discussion of the issue (Section II.A of
the opinion) begins:
The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute,
begins with its text. Because a treaty ratified by the United States is
an agreement among sovereign powers, we have also considered as
aids to its interpretation the negotiation and drafting history of the
treaty as well as the postratification understanding of
signatory nations. 82

After concluding that the relevant treaty provision in the case was
Article 94(1) of the UN Charter, the majority then closely examined
the text of Article 94(1), specifically the phrase that the United
States “undertakes to comply with the decision” of the International
Court of Justice in cases to which the United States is a party. From
this text the majority concluded “[t]he Article is not a directive to
domestic courts”; for this proposition it cited Foster’s observation
that the treaty was non-self-executing because “its text . . . did not
act directly on the grants.” 83
The majority then pointed to Article 94(2) of the Charter, which
(according to the majority) “provides the sole remedy for
noncompliance: referral to the United Nations Security Council by
an aggrieved state.” 84 The opinion described executive branch
materials indicating that at the time of ratification the U.S. executive
branch understood Article 94(2) as an exclusive remedy, concluding
that “Medellín’s view that ICJ decisions are automatically
enforceable as domestic law is fatally undermined by the

82. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506–07 (citations omitted). This opening paragraph cited
four cases: Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217 (1996); United States v. Stuart,
489 U.S. 353 (1989); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985); and Choctaw Nation v. United
States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943). Id. All four cases involved the interpretation of a treaty’s terms in
general, not specifically the question of self-execution. Thus the majority appeared to equate
the self-execution inquiry to ordinary interpretation of a treaty’s terms, which is consistent
with the textual approach to self-execution.
83. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 508 (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253,
314, 315 (1829)).
84. Id. at 509.
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enforcement structure established by Article 94,” 85 and later that
“where a treaty does not provide a particular remedy, . . . it is not for
the federal courts to impose one on the States through lawmaking of
their own.” 86 Responding to the dissent, the majority reemphasized
that “Given our obligation to interpret treaty provisions to
determine whether they are self-executing, we have to confess that
we do think it rather important to look to the treaty language to see
what it has to say about the issue”—what it later described as
“resorting to the text” and a “time-honored textual approach.” 87
The Medellín majority’s approach seems consistent with the
textual framework sketched in previous Sections of this Article. The
majority understood the non-self-execution inquiry to be whether
the treaty itself (as reflected mainly in its text) provided a rule of
decision for U.S. courts, or whether it was directed to other
branches, requiring them first to create a rule of decision before
U.S. courts had anything to apply. It found the latter, based
principally on two parts of the text: (a) that Article 94(1) called for
future action, and (b) that Article 94(2) provided an exclusive
remedy in the Security Council.
The first of these points, standing alone, seems inadequate.
While it is true that the provision in question called for the United
States to take future action, that is not enough to exclude the
provision from courts. Courts, like other branches of government,
can take actions within their constitutional powers to implement
treaty obligations (as discussed above regarding Ware). 88 A U.S.
court might have judicial power to assure future compliance with an
ICJ judgment (depending on the nature of that judgment). For
example, if the ICJ concluded that a U.S. treaty obligation required
the United States to allow Ware to sue to collect his debt from
Hylton, without legal impediments, a U.S. court would seem to have
85. Id. at 511.
86. Id. at 513–14 (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 347 (2006)).
The Medellín Court added that its interpretation was consistent with the executive
branch’s interpretation, which “is entitled to great weight.” Id. at 513 (quoting
Sumitomo Shoji American Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982), a case about
ordinary treaty interpretation).
87. Id. at 514. In this passage the majority also described the Foster/Percheman episode,
see supra text accompanying note 55, as evidence of the self-execution/non-self-execution
question being resolved by the treaty’s text.
88. See supra note 66; see also Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson, supra note 9, at 145
(making this point).
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judicial power to enforce that result without implementing
legislation, even though the obligation is something to be performed
in the future. To be sure, some ICJ judgments might involve future
actions that could only be done by the political branches (for
example, if the judgment expressly required the United States to
enact legislation). But a requirement for future action does not
categorically require non-self-execution.
Thus the Medellín majority’s conclusion principally depends on
the assertion of an exclusive Security Council remedy through
Article 94(2). Here, the majority’s conclusion seems correct (and
consistent with the textual framework for non-self-execution) if its
reading of the treaty language was correct. If the treaty had
specifically stated that Security Council action would be the sole
remedy for a nation’s failure to comply with an ICJ ruling, then that
would seem decisive: the treaty itself would declare that U.S. courts
lack authority to use it as a rule of decision. Pursuant to Article VI of
the Constitution, the exclusive remedy provision would be part of
the supreme law of the land and binding on U.S. judges as much as
any other provision in the Charter; thus the provisions relating to
the ICJ would be non-self-executing by their terms. And if that is
true of an express declaration of an exclusive remedy, it should also
be true of an implicit declaration of an exclusive remedy. (One may
question, however, whether the Court correctly found the Security
Council remedy to be exclusive). 89 As a result, Medellín appears
simply to illustrate another way a treaty provision may be non-selfexecuting: if the treaty itself provides for an exclusive alternative
forum for enforcement.
Unfortunately, in its introduction and in parts of its later
response to the dissent, the Medellín majority confused the matter in
two ways. First, in its general opening overview of the law, it called
89. In finding the Security Council remedy exclusive, the majority relied heavily on the
practical advantages for U.S. policy makers of an exclusive remedy. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at
511–12 (concluding that “[i]n light of the U.N. Charter’s remedial scheme,” including the
U.S. opportunity to veto Security Council action, “there is no reason to believe that the
President and Senate signed up for [direct judicial enforcement]”). Although this passage relies
on the probable intent of the U.S. treatymakers, it does so in order to interpret the treaty’s
text—specifically to decide whether the treaty’s designated enforcement mechanism is
exclusive. As discussed, this is an appropriate use of the U.S. treatymakers’ intent. See supra
Section II.B.6.
Professor Sloss argues that, under this view, Texas’ execution of Medellín, in violation of
the ICJ judgment, would violate the due process clause. See Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson,
supra note 9, at 185–87. This Article expresses no opinion on that suggestion.
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into question whether a non-self-executing treaty is part of domestic
law: “This Court has long recognized the distinction between
treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law, and those
that . . . do not by themselves function as binding federal law.” 90 In
an associated footnote the majority added “What we mean by ‘selfexecuting’ is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal
law upon ratification.” 91 These statements are misleading. As
discussed, all treaties are part of U.S. domestic law; the selfexecution question is whether their provisions establish a rule of
decision for courts. These statements are also unnecessary, because
nothing in the majority’s reasoning or holding required it to find
that Article 94 was not part of U.S. domestic law. To the contrary, as
discussed above, the Court concluded that Article 94, as part of
domestic law, precluded a domestic judicial remedy by its own terms.
Second, the majority undermined its adherence to textual
interpretation later in the opinion by referring to the “intent” of the
President and the Senate. 92 In context, it appears that the majority
meant the intent as discerned from the treaty’s text—several of the
key passages refer to intent discerned from text, and they come after
the textual discussion highlighted above. But in isolation, the
language could be understood as making non-self-execution turn on
the preferences—perhaps even the unexpressed or presumed
preferences—of the U.S. treatymakers. As discussed, this is not
consistent with Article VI. 93 The U.S. treatymakers cannot affect a
treaty provision’s legal status except by changing its status in the
treaty itself. It is the treaty, not the intent, that binds courts, so the
only way a treaty provision is not a rule of decision for courts is if the
treaty says it is not. Again, this misdirection was unnecessary. The
majority’s reasoning and conclusion did not depend on appeal to

90. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504.
91. Id. at 505 n.2.
92. See id. at 523 (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360 (2006))
(“Nothing in the text, background, negotiating and drafting history, or practice among
signatory nations suggests that the President or Senate intended the improbable result of
giving the judgments of an international tribunal a higher status than that enjoyed by ‘many of
our most fundamental constitutional protections.’”); see also id. at 521 (“Our cases simply
require courts to decide whether a treaty’s terms reflect a determination by the President who
negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has domestic effect.”); id. at 519
(“[W]e have held treaties to be self-executing when the textual provisions indicate that the
President and Senate intended for the agreement to have domestic effect.”).
93. See supra Section I.C. & II.B.6.
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unenacted intent. It seems clear that the majority principally
appealed to intent to assess whether the treaty’s text created an
exclusive remedy at the Security Council—otherwise, the references
to intent are hard to reconcile with the opinion’s strong focus on the
text elsewhere.
In sum, Medellín’s basic approach was correct within a textual
framework: one must examine the text of the treaty to see if the
treaty provides a rule of decision for courts or whether it calls for an
intermediate step whereby another actor (typically Congress, as the
lawmaking body under the U.S. Constitution) creates a rule of
decision to implement the treaty. 94 As I read its opinion, the Medellín
majority concluded that the treaty’s text identified the Security
Council as the sole remedy for noncompliance with an ICJ judgment
and thus by its terms precluded domestic judicial remedies. That is
entirely consistent with the text-based approach sketched above.
B. Treaty Non-Self-Execution after Medellín
This Subsection briefly considers two post-Medellín court of
appeals decisions, one finding a treaty self-executing and one finding
a treaty non-self-executing. It concludes that both decisions are

94. Justice Breyer’s dissent faulted the majority for an unduly text-bound approach. See
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 548–49 (Breyer, J., dissenting). However, Breyer’s complaint seems
principally founded on his view that the majority insisted on an express embrace of selfexecution in the treaty’s text. That disagreement aside, Breyer’s dissent also focused on the
treaty’s text. See id. at 549–50 (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (asking
whether “the treaty provision ‘addresses itself to the political . . . department[s]’ for further
action or to ‘the judicial department’ for direct enforcement” (emphasis added)). See also id. at
551–62 (discussing seven factors suggesting self-execution, of which at least the first three are
based on the treaty’s text). Thus Breyer’s principal objection was not that the majority
emphasized the text, but rather that (in his view) the majority unreasonably demanded that the
text expressly call for self-execution.
If Justice Breyer correctly understood the majority to require an express statement of selfexecution, his concerns seem valid. As he explained, often a treaty—especially a multilateral
treaty—will not address domestic implementation directly because the treaty parties have
differing domestic regimes regarding treaty obligations. However, the dissent likely overread
the majority’s requirement here. As discussed, the majority rested principally on the specific
“undertakes to comply” language in Article 94(1) and the Security Council remedy in Article
94(2). Neither the Charter as a whole nor Article 94 has any specific direction of selfexecution. If specific direction were required, analysis of the individual provisions would not
have been necessary to demonstrate non-self-execution. Rather, the majority opinion seems
better understood as deriving non-self-execution from the affirmative meaning of particular
provisions rather than from the absence of a self-execution directive.
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correct under a textual approach, thus indicating that the approach is
a manageable one.
In Brzak v. United Nations, 95 the issue was whether the
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations
(CPIUN) 96 was self-executing. Plaintiffs sued the United Nations
and various U.N. officials for sex discrimination, but the CPIUN
provides that “the United Nations . . . shall enjoy immunity from
every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it
has expressly waived its immunity.”97 According to the court of
appeals, quoting Medellín, the self-execution question turned upon
whether “the treaty contains stipulations which . . . require no
legislation to make them operative.” 98 The court relied on the
treaty’s text, its ratification history and post-ratification executive
branch practice to find the provision self-executing (and thus it
dismissed the suit).
Under a textual approach to treaty non-self-execution, this
conclusion seems correct. Examining only the treaty text, one can
see that the obligation established by the CPIUN is specific, not
dependent on policy discretion for implementation, and addressed to
the type of activity (management of litigation) within U.S. courts’
core constitutional powers. The text provides no reason to think it is
addressed to a branch of domestic government other than the
judiciary. 99 It is true that the CPIUN does not expressly say it is selfexecuting, but the court of appeals did not read Medellín to require
such an express statement; creation of a judicially manageable
obligation was sufficient. Notably, the conclusion as to self-execution
can be reached without any investigation of the intent of the treaty
parties apart from the text (although the court did go on to consider
ratification and post-ratification evidence as well).

95. 597 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010).
96. Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418 (entered into force in the United States
Apr. 29, 1970).
97. Id. at art. II.
98. Brzak, 597 F.3d at 111 (quoting Medellín, 552 U.S. at 505–06).
99. The court further pointed out that Section 34 of the CPIUN requires a country
acceding to the treaty to be “in a position under its own law to give effect” to the treaty; the
court interpreted this to mean that a country could accede only if no further domestic
lawmaking was needed. Id. It then went on to consider the views of the executive and
legislative branches.
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In contrast, in Doe v. Holder, 100 the same court of appeals found
the relevant provision of the U.N. Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime (CATOC) 101 to be non-self-executing. Doe, a
citizen of Ghana, faced removal from the United States to Ghana
based on his involvement in international drug smuggling; he sought
protection under the CATOC because he had assisted U.S.
authorities in arresting and convicting other members of his drugsmuggling operation. CATOC provides: “Each state party shall take
appropriate measures within its means to provide effective protection
from potential retaliation or intimidation for witnesses in criminal
proceedings who give testimony concerning offences covered by [the
CATOC].” 102 The court found this provision non-self-executing
(and thus of no assistance to Doe in resisting his removal to Ghana):
Under the CATOC, the signatories commit to provide “effective”
witness protection . . . . “Effective” protection is not specifically
defined. Rather, Article 24 explains later that such protection
“may” consist of, “inter alia,” physical protection, relocation, nondisclosure of the witness’s identity and location, and the use of
video-link testimony. It is therefore left to the signatory’s discretion
to determine what measures are “appropriate” and “within its
means,” and what protection is sufficiently “effective.” 103

The court further noted that the CATOC directs that “[e]ach
State Party shall take necessary measures, including legislative and
administrative measures, . . . to ensure the implementation of its
obligations under this Convention” and concluded that “[t]hus, the
CATOC specifically envisions that it will be implemented by
additional domestic legislative actions.” 104
100. 763 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 2014). Coincidentally, Brzak and Doe were written by the
same judge, Barrington D. Parker.
101. Nov. 15, 2000, T.I.A.S. 13127, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 [hereinafter CATOC].
102. Id. at art. 24.
103. Doe, 763 F.3d at 256.
104. Id. (quoting CATOC, supra note 101, at art. 34). The court also noted the
executive and legislative branches’ view that the CATOC was non-self-executing. Notably, the
CATOC witness protection provisions seem most directly addressed to the executive branch,
which would be the principal decision-maker as to what steps would be taken regarding
particular witnesses. To reiterate an earlier point, the common formulation that non-selfexecuting treaties are addressed to Congress is an oversimplification. Non-self-executing
provisions are addressed to a branch of government other than the judiciary. Further, because
the CATOC is part of the supreme law of the land under Article VI, its provisions should be
seen as part of federal law. But see Doe, 763 F.3d at 255 (describing non-self-executing treaty
provisions as “not domestic law”) (quoting Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008)).
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As in Brzak, Doe indicates that non-self-execution issues can be
resolved without appeal to an atextual intent of the treaty parties (or
of the U.S. treatymakers). Although in both cases the court noted
the positions of the executive and legislative branches, reliance on
these positions was not needed to reach the conclusion. Thus, the
treaty provisions in the two cases provide a useful contrast between
obligations that are self-executing under a textual approach and
those that are not. They also indicate that the issue of treaty nonself-execution need not be a mysterious one.
IV. CONCLUSION: A TEXTUAL RESTATEMENT OF NON-SELFEXECUTION DOCTRINE
The foregoing discussion supports the following restatement of
non-self-execution law, derived from the Constitution’s text and
applied in Medellín:
(1) All U.S. treaties are the supreme law of the land and binding on
U.S. judges to the same extent and in the same manner as statutes
and the Constitution, except for (a) unconstitutional treaties
(treaties or treaty provisions that go beyond the constitutional
authority of the U.S. treatymakers) and (b) treaty provisions that
conflict with subsequently enacted statutes.
(2) U.S. courts must apply binding treaty provisions in cases
properly brought before them to the extent the treaty provisions by
their terms provide applicable rules of decision for courts.
(3) A treaty provision does not provide a rule of decision for a U.S.
court if it calls for action outside the constitutional judicial power
of U.S. courts. Treaties that expressly or implicitly call for
legislative or other non-judicial action, or preclude judicial
remedies, do not provide rules of decision for courts. Whether a
treaty calls for non-judicial action or precludes judicial remedies is a
question of the meaning of the treaty’s text, as interpreted using
ordinary methods of determining textual meaning.

Thus the executive branch should have understood itself to be under a (nonjusticiable)
domestic law obligation to comply with CATOC (subject to considerable discretion as to what
CATOC required). To the extent the court suggested otherwise, its discussion is not
consistent with a textual approach to treaty non-self-execution. However, the court correctly
concluded that the treaty provisions, because of the way they were written, did not create a
rule of decision for U.S. courts.
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This approach contrasts with the proposition that the intent of
the U.S. treatymakers can determine the status of treaty obligations.
Under that approach, a treaty provision that by its terms establishes a
rule of decision for U.S. courts would nonetheless not be a rule of
decision if the President and/or the Senate intended that it should
not be. That approach is contrary to the categorical rule of Article
VI, which is binding on the President and the Senate. The only way
the treatymakers can prevent a treaty from being a rule of decision in
U.S. courts is to draft the treaty so that by its terms it does not
create a rule of decision for U.S. courts.
To be sure, it may often be a difficult inquiry whether the terms
of a treaty create a rule of decision for U.S. courts. That is likely to
be especially true because the treaty parties may not have domestic
effect in mind in drafting and approving the treaty. Nonetheless, this
account illustrates how non-self-execution can be understood
conceptually as consistent with the text of Article VI, even if that
concept is not always easy to apply in practice.
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